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After the elections in the UK and the clear majority of the Conservative Party under
Prime Minister Boris Johnson in UK House of Commons, a prompt ratification of the
draft Agreement of the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU (WA) and
the subsequent exit of the UK from the EU on 31 January 2020 is to be expected.
This completes phase 1 of ‘Brexit’: Dealing with the legacy of the UK’s membership.
We are now entering phase 2: The negotiation of and the decision about the future
relationship between the EU27 and the UK. Originally, phase 2 should be concluded
during the transition period of the Withdrawal Agreement, during which the UK
remains part of the internal market and subject to EU law. This transition period
expires on 31 December 2020 (Article 126 WA). The Joint Committee (JC) of the WA
(composed of officials of the European Commission and the UK Government) can
adopt, by consensus, a single decision extending the transition period for up to 1 or 2
years (Article 132(1) WA). Such decision can be requested from both the EU and the
UK. The purpose of this prolongation possibility was originally (in March 2019) and
still is to avoid an undesired ‘hard Brexit’ because of unfinished trade negotiations.
The decision of the JC to extend the transition period must be taken before 1 July
2020.
The newly elected Prime Minister Johnson does not intend to make use of this
prolongation possibility and wants to strike a trade deal before 31 December 2020.
In order to emphasise this commitment, ‘a Downing Street source’ announced that
the UK Prime Minister wants to amend the Withdrawal Agreement Bill ratifying the
Withdrawal Agreement in such a way that it legally rules out the possibility to prolong
the transition period. In the event of a trade agreement between the EU27 and the
UK not being ratified on 31 December 2020, there will be a ‘hard Brexit’ on 1 January
2021 if the deadline of 1 July 2020 elapses without any prolongation decision of the
JC. 
This situation begs the question whether there are other possibilities – past 1 July
2020 – to prolong the transition period of the WA if needed. The way to do this would
be an amendment of the Withdrawal Agreement itself by exchanging the ending
date in Article 126 WA. Some argue now that any other way to change the transition
period than its prolongation by the JC is legally impossible. The argument is based
on the reading of Article 50 TEU that its applicability to the Withdrawal Agreement
ceases in the moment the UK has exited the EU and that besides Article 50 TEU
there is no legal base in the EU Treaties that would allow the EU to amend the WA.
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General Public International Law Allows for
Amendments of the WA
Another reading of the legal situation is, however, supportable. The argument is
built on general public international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties (VCLT), which is considered to codify customary international law when it
comes to the law of the Treaties, provides in Article 39 for a general rule, according
to which a ‘treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid
down in Part II [on the conclusion and the entry into force of Treaties] apply to such
an agreement except insofar as the treaty may otherwise provide’. The WA provides
for a legal base for the JC to ‘adopt decisions amending this Agreement’ (Article
164(5)(d) WA) but excludes ‘Part Four’ from its scope, which includes the end date
of the WA. Although this is a specific Treaty rule that allows for amendments of the
Treaty text, it only covers parts of it. Drawing the conclusion from the presence of
such a limited amendment rule that the Treaty parties are deprived from amending
the Treaty text themselves seems stretched. Such clauses enable quick technical
amendments in place of lengthy ratification procedures. But they cannot bar the
Treaty Parties from amending the Treaty text between them. In other words, the
WA is silent on the revision of its text by the Treaty parties in general and, more
specifically, of Part Four of the WA with the end date of the transition period.
This brings us back to the starting point, according to which general public
international law allows for an amendment of the WA including the end date of the
transition period after 1 July 2020. This leads to the follow-up question on the legal
base and the procedure to follow for such an amendment. On the part of the UK, the
legal base and the procedure to follow is to be found in domestic law. The capacity
of the UK to conclude Treaties includes the capacity to amend them. Provided that
domestic law does not prescribe any special rules for the amendment of the WA, the
traditional rules on Treaty ratification apply.
In Search of The Union Competence to Amend the
Withdrawal Agreement
On the part of the EU, the situation is more complicated. The EU may only act
if it is at least implicitly empowered to act. There must hence be a legal base for
amending the WA. A literal reading of the original legal base for the conclusion of
the WA excludes the use of Article 50(2) TEU. This article requires an agreement
with a ‘Member State which decides to withdraw’. Once the other Treaty party
involved in the WA is no more a Member State, Article 50(2) TEU seems to cease
to apply. Besides Article 50(2) TEU, Article 207 TFEU or Article 217 TFEU could
be considered as possible legal bases, given that the amendment of an agreement
is formally just another agreement. Yet, the WA exceeds the scope of Article 207
TFEU as its content covers more than ‘common commercial policy’. Also Article 217
TFEU seems to be a rather weak legal base as it would require the establishment of
an ‘association’. Although it is not completely unimaginable to qualify the ‘reciprocal
rights and obligations’ in the WA as the creation of some sort of association between
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the UK and the EU, the entire purpose of the WA (except for the Protocol on
Northern Ireland) is not meant to create an association that lasts but to deal with
legacy issues of the former membership of the UK in the EU. A further thought would
be to consider unwritten implied external Union competences as mentioned in Article
216 TFEU and the ERTA case law. But also the categories of implied external Union
competences do not seems to cover the entire scope of the WA. This leads us to the
(interim) conclusion that EU law does not provide for any legal base to enter into an
agreement that amends the WA so that any amendments of the WA are ruled out by
EU law.
This understanding of EU Law makes the WA a ‘fossilised’ international agreement
that could never be changed. Such Treaties (especially bilateral ones such as the
WA) are unknown to public international law. The existence of such Treaties would
run counter the general international law principle (which is even considered to
have the quality of ius cogens) enshrined in Article 6 VCLT, according to which
the legal capacity to conclude Treaties cannot be limited by Treaties. Violation of
Treaty obligations because of the conclusion of another Treaty may be sanctioned
according to the principles of state responsibility but the capacity to enter into other
Treaties may not be limited by Treaty obligations. This finding holds also true for the
EU. On this basis, it is valid to state, that as a matter of principle, whenever the EU
enters into an international agreement, it must also have the competence to amend
this agreement or to suspend it in accordance with either the procedures foreseen by
the agreement or general public international law.
Analogous Application of Article 50 TEU
Against this background, EU law seems to have a lacuna in the case of Withdrawal
Agreements if the legal basis for concluding such agreements ceases to apply at
the moment of their entry into force. The existence of such a lacuna paves the way
for an analogous application of Article 50(2) TEU. This provision must then be read
as including a former Member State in its capacity as Treaty party to a Withdrawal
Agreement with the EU. The decision-making procedure for amendments of a
Withdrawal Agreement is hence also defined by Article 50 TEU: a qualified majority
voting in Council of the EU27 upon consent of the European Parliament.
If therefore the deadline of 1 July 2020 elapses unused and it turns out in November
2020 that a ‘hard Brexit’ on 1 January 2021 can only be avoided by extending the
transition period of the WA in its Article 126, general public international law says
that this is legally possible and an analogous application to Article 50 TEU provides
for the necessary legal base on the part of the EU.
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